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Abstract. Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 requires that planning and emergency response agencies 
be able to communicate with the public in nonemergency situations in order to help citizens understand the risks they face from hazardous 
materials and to secure citizen participation in designing responses to chemical emergencies. Both research and reports from the field indicate 
that, with notable exceptions, most Local Emergency Planning Committees created for this purpose are making little or no effort at proactive 
communication. As a result, citizens are not being educated effectively about the hazards they face and are not acting as full partners in 
emergency response and risk management planning. This paper draws on research and field observations, identifies ten major barriers to sound 
risk communication, and offers organizational and tactical suggestions for overcoming each barrier. 
INTRODUCTION 
The planning process mandated by Title III of the 1986 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) 
requires that local planning and emergency response agen-
cies be able to communicate with the public in nonemergency 
situations, in order to help citizens understand the risks they 
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face from hazardous materials and to secure citizen participa-
tion in designing responses to chemical emergencies. This 
responsibility is vested most directly in SARA-mandated 
Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) that have 
been formed throughout the nation (see Musselman, 1989, 
for an overview ofTitle III). Advocates ofthe legislation saw 
this process as a potential catalyst for community debate 
about environmental issues (Florio, 1987). 
Unfortunately, both research and reports from the field indi-
cate that, with notable exceptions, most LEPCs are having 
little or no effort at communicating proactively with the 
public. Even if they wish to increase their levels of commu-
nication, many lack the skills necessary to do so successfully. 
As a result, citizens are not being educated effectively about 
the hazards they face and are not acting as full partners in the 
emergency response and risk management planning process 
(Conn et aI., 1990). 
This paper identifies some major barriers to effective 
nonemergency risk communication and offers suggestions 
about what can be done by LEPCs to overcome each barrier. 
Our analysis is based on a combination ofour own and others' 
research findings and on our less fonnal observations of 
response and planning organizations. 
Our research has involved four main components: (l)a mail 
survey of the chairs and members of all LEPCs in Virginia 
prior to Title Ill's October 1988 deadline for completing local 
emergency response plans, as well as case studies examining 
the activities of selected LEPCs (Conn et aI., 1988); (2)a mail 
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survey of the chairs and members of a national sample of 
LEPCs conducted well after the 1988 deadline, together with 
case studies of especially aggressive risk communication 
efforts by LEPCs and other organizations (Conn et aI., 1990; 
Rich et al" I990a); (3)case studies ofthe emergency and post-
emergency risk communication that accompanied actual 
chemical accidents (Rich et aI., 1990b); and (4)a field test of 
a technique for communicating fairly complicated emer-
gency preparedness information in the absence of an emer-
gency (conducted in cooperation with the National Institute 
for Chemical Studies, and still in progress). We also have had 
the opportunity to learn about the operation and practices of 
many organizations with risk communication responsibili-
ties through our role as editors of a quarterly publication 
entitled Hazardous Materials Dialogue, which is distributed 
to LEPCs, the State Emergency Response Commissions that 
oversee them, government officials, citizens' organizations, 
and researchers across the nation. 
Although we have confidence in the validity of the underly-
ing research, we must recognize that our recommendations 
for action have not been evaluated systematically in practice. 
As a result, we suggest that, for the time being, they be judged 
on highly pragmatic grounds-by asking if they make sense 
in light of experience and ifthey work when tried. Certainly, 
each recommendation will be more appropriate to some 
LEPCs than to others. 
BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE RISK 
COMMUNICATION 
Our observations suggest ten broad problems that make it 
difficult for LEPCs to mount risk communication programs. 
Conceptually, these can be divided into problems that are 
institutional (having to do with the design ofthe LEPCs) and 
problems that are more situational (stemming from the nature 
of chemical hazards and risk communication). In practice, 
the two types of problems interact. In our opinion, many of 
the difficulties LEPCs face in risk communication stem from 
the fact that Title Ill's institutional arrangements were devel-
oped essentially without reference to the demands of the task 
of risk communication. Our discussion will move from the 
more institutional to the more situational problems. since it is 
the fonner that set the context for addressing those problems 
that are more practice-oriented. 
I.  Unclear Mandate: Perhaps the most basic barrier to 
effective risk communication is a lack of consensus 
among LEPCs about what kind of risk communication 
efforts are required of them under the Emergency Plan-
ning and Community Right-to-Know Act (as SARA's 
Title III also is called). The basic question is whether 
they have to do anything more than (a)include members 
from the SARA-mandated categories on their commit-
tees, (b)passively make information on chemical haz-
ards available to the public, and (c)hold open planning 
meetings. While the legislative history of Title III can 
support an argument that the spirit of the law requires a 
proactive stance, the letter of the law requires very little 
from LEPCs (Hadden, 1989; Musselman, 1989). Our 
contention is that, regardless of Title Ill's provisions, a 
sound case can be made for aggressive risk communica-
tion efforts, on the grounds of their value to the emer-
gency planning mission. The following considerations 
are pertinent: 
Only if the public is made aware of risks is political 
pressure for risk reduction likely to be generated. Most 
responders and citizens would agree that it is far better to 
avoid accidents than to attempt to cope with their conse-
quences. 
Although existing empirical evidence on the impact of 
pre-emergency communication generally is inconclu-
sive (Sorensen and Mileti, 1990), it is reasonable to 
suppose that citizens who have been given infonnation 
in advance are more likely to know how to cooperate 
with responders in emergency situations and how to take 
protective action, where possible. If so, communication 
would make the responders' job easier and response 
plans more effective. 
Similarly, where full communication precedes an emer-
gency, citizens may be more willing to accept officials' 
instructions and cooperate with response efforts. If a 
threat comes as a complete surprise, citizens may be 
skeptical of authorities' interpretation of the danger and 
judgement about how to respond to it. This could cause 
delays that cost lives. 
In the longer tenn, if citizens have a full understanding 
of the dangers they face, they may become the political 
allies of local responders, working to secure adequate 
equipment, funding, and administrative support for re-
sponse organizations. 
2. "Decide-and-Announce" Approach: Most LEPCs are 
led by emergency responders and administrators who are 
accustomed to evaluating the available infonnation, 
deciding on the best course ofaction to protect the public, 
announcing what will be done, and having their decision 
accepted. While this may be essential in an emergency 
situation, the approach does not build the trust necessary 
for citizens to accept officialjudgments about acceptable 
risks or appropriate emergency precautions, and it can 
contribute to public "outrage" if things go wrong (Sand-
man, 1989). More important, this approach will not 
overcome public resistance to risk messages and will fail 
to get public attention in advance, so that citizens know 
what to do in an emergency or can act as infonned 
participants in the planning process (Scanlon, 1990). 
Since responders cannot protect everyone in an emer-
gency, it is vital that citizens do what they can to protect 
themselves. It also makes more sense for the community 
to debate chemical hazards openly and reach agreement 
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on a policy to reduce the risk of accidents than to count 
on being able to deal successfully with them when they 
happen. As aresult, LEPCs and other responsible parties 
should adopt a new approach to dealing with the public. 
A two-pronged attack is needed. First, there should be a 
concerted effort to introduce LEPC members to new 
ways of looking at their communication tasks. This 
effort should focus especially on LEPC chairs, since 
these individuals tend to set the agenda for most local 
committees. The central idea to convey here is that 
citizens' acceptance of a risk message depends on their 
acceptance of the process by which the content of a 
message was detennined, just as much as it depends on 
the perceived accuracy of the message (NRC, 1989). 
Citizens are far more likely to accept a process as 
legitimate if it was open to public scrutiny, input, and 
questions. This means that success in getting a message 
across (and in designing an effective response to haz-
ards) can depend on providing for two-way communica-
tion with the public. 
Second, LEPCs should work to diversify their member-
ship to bring in new perspectives. Most local committees 
would benefit from having more members from civic 
and community organizations, the medical profession 
(especially public health), businesses other than the 
chemical industry, and the media. These people can 
bring a layman's perspective to discussions of what 
citizens need to know to understand chemical hazards 
and to become involved meaningfully in the planning 
process. They also can help discover what approach to 
risk communication might be most effective in reaching 
the public in given locales. Having members from 
different backgrounds also will help in solving some of 
the other problems we address below. 
3. Lack ofResources: Most LEPCs have neitherthe budget 
nor the staff to undertake expensive and time-consuming 
risk communication campaigns successfully. Part of the 
solution to this problem (and a big step toward resolving 
others) is to define a proper role for the LEPC in risk 
communication. Just as LEPCs are expected to plan 
emergency responses but are not expected actually to 
respond to emergencies, so they should plan a proactive 
risk communication campaign without being expected 
to actually carry out major risk communication tasks. 
Their most productive roles are to design effective risk 
communication systems, to act as advocates for aggres-
sive risk communication efforts by other agencies, and to 
coordinate the communication efforts of other organiza-
tions (Conn et aI., 1990; Rich et aI., 1990a). 
Their success in adopting these roles will depend on their 
ability to persuade other public agencies and private 
organizations to take responsibility for major risk com-
munication tasks. Clear directions from the Environ-
• 
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mental Protection Agency about the proper scope of 
LEPC responsibility in this area could help them per-
suade other organizations to take operational roles in risk 
communication. 
Until they succeed in establishing this planning/advocat-
ing/coordinating role, LEPCs that accept responsibility 
for proactive risk communication can stretch their re-
sources through the following strategies. First, they 
should recognize that risk communication often is most 
effective when approached as a two-step process, in 
which the LEPC does not try to reach citizens directly 
but communicates with them through respected commu-
nity organizations. By having community groups host 
presentations prepared by the LEPC, distribute written 
materials to their members, or sponsor discussions of 
hazardous materials issues, LEPCs can reach a large 
number of citizens far more cheaply than by doing these 
things directly. Moreover, this two-step approach al-
lows LEPCs to enhance their credibility by "borrowing" 
the trust members have for their own organizations. 
When people hear a message from a trusted source in a 
familiar setting, they are far more likely to take it 
seriously than if it comes from an impersonal authority 
through an anonymous channel (Krimsky and Plough, 
1988). Moreover, LEPCs can magnify their resources by 
tapping into the volunteers, money, etc., that community 
organizations can put into public education efforts. One 
tactic for working through established groups is to create 
a "speakers' bureau" of LEPC members and others who 
can make presentations on emergency preparedness at 
meetings of local organizations. 
A second approach to overcoming resource limitations is 
for the LEPC to seek funding and technical support for 
risk communication efforts from the local chemical 
industry, while maintaining control overwhatiscommu-
nicated. Although individual plants may be reluctant to 
make infonnation on hazards public, many facilities will 
see working with the LEPC as a way of gaining public 
trust (Covello et aI., 1988; Baram etal., 1992) and will be 
willing to support the production and distribution of 
pamphlets, videos, and other materials. Care must be 
taken, however, to avoid the reality, or even the percep-
tion, of industry cooption of the LEPC's message. 
4. Lack of Expertise in Risk Communication: Risk com-
munication is a complex business in which well-
intentioned efforts can tum into a waste of resources, or 
even a public relations disaster. Successfully fannulat-
ing and delivering risk messages requires knowledge 
and skills that most LEPC members simply don't have. 
Similarly, actively involving citizens in the planning 
process requires public relations skills and knowledge of 
citizen participation techniques that are possessed by 
few LEPC members (Conn et aI., 1990). Under these 
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conditions, it is natural that local committees would give 
little attention to such unfamiliar tasks. 
Several strategies can be employed to secure the skills 
necessary for sound risk communication. It may be 
possible to rely on the media representatives that SARA 
mandates for each LEPC. In practice, however, these 
individuals often are from the management side of the 
media and can provide little help in solving practical 
communication problems. In this situation, local com-
mittees would be well-advised to expand the number of 
media members and, specifically, to recruit people who 
can offer advice on how to design media campaigns. In 
addition, they can tap into other pools of communication 
skills, such as local advertising or public relations finns 
who may be willing to provide expertise as a community 
service. 
Since the tasks of risk communication go beyond field-
ing well-worded, eye-catching messages, LEPCs also 
may need to call on persons with experience in citizen 
participation techniques who can help design and man-
age outreach efforts that involve two-way communica-
tion. Such people usually can be found in city or county 
planning departments. In addition, the local League of 
Women Voters often will have experience in encourag-
ing citizen participation, and generally is regarded by 
citizens as an objective, trustworthy sponsor of outreach 
efforts. 
Colleges and universities also can be valuable sources of 
free or inexpensive advice about communication meth-
ods. Local Emergency Planning Committees should 
seek faculty members in departments such as communi-
cation, planning, political science, sociology, and urban 
affairs, who may be willing to perform community 
service by acting as consultants or by evaluating the 
impact of outreach efforts. Often, graduate students can 
make valuable contributions by working as interns on 
LEPC projects or by taking on some aspect of the 
LEPC's work as part of their research for advanced 
degrees. 
5. Lack of Procedures: The vast majority of LEPCs have 
not developed procedures for communicating routinely 
with the public about chemical hazards (Conn et aI., 
1990; Lindell and Meier, 1991). They talk with industry 
and government agencies, but any efforts to reach the 
public usually are ad hoc responses to specific problems. 
While emergency communication responsibilities gen-
erally are well-established, responsibility for 
nonemergency communication seldom is delegated spe-
cifically, with the result that it usually is given a low 
priority. 
To be successful, risk communication must be integrated 
into overall response planning and risk management 
efforts, and it must be systematic. For this reason, we 
argue that risk communication efforts should be guided 
bya plan,just as emergency preparedness is, and that the 
plan for risk communication should be a fonnal part of 
the overall emergency response plan developed by the 
LEPC. The risk communication plan should assign 
authority for different aspects of nonemergency commu-
nication and should describe procedures to be followed 
in efforts to reach the public. At a minimum, it should 
specify in detail how chemical hazard infonnation will 
be made available to the public (as required by Title 111) 
and how the public will be assisted in making effective 
use of this information. It also should provide for the 
establishment of an advisory committee to assist in 
fonnutating and disseminating messages, and for the 
development ofworking relationships between response 
planners and the local media. 
6. Political Fears: Public officials and business leaders 
often are reluctant to have chemical hazards discussed 
openly, for fear that public debate will result in demands 
for government action to reduce the hazards, will bring 
pressure on local firms, or will lead the public to blame 
incumbents for adverse situations. We refer to these 
possible outcomes as "the risks of risk communication." 
If LEPCs and others are to get the political support they 
need to engage in effective risk communication, they 
must recognize these fears (whether justified or not) and 
find ways to overcome them. 
Local Emergency Planning Committees should approach 
officials with proposals for proactive risk communica-
tion efforts only after the committee members them-
selves have a finn understanding of the importance of 
such efforts to effective emergency response and risk 
management. They should be prepared to argue that the 
risks of not communicating are far greater than the risks 
of informing the public. While revealing the existence of 
a hazard may bring government and business some 
adverse publicity at first, this will be minor compared to 
the outrage that would follow an accident in which lives 
were lost or people were injured, because citizens had 
not been informed of a danger known to public or private 
officials. Most officials should be able to see advance 
communication as being in their enlightened self-inter-
est. In addition, LEPCs can suggest that educational 
efforts are likely to make emergency response more 
effective, thereby enhancing officials' standing with the 
public. 
Since many of local officials' fears about proactive risk 
communication revolve around concerns about its po-
tentially negative impact on the business community, a 
good strategy is to enlist the aid of local industry repre-
sentatives when trying to sell risk communication pro-
grams to local government. Similarly, some officials 
fear overreaction by local environmental or neighbor-
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hood groups. Since showing that these groups approve 
of the planned activities and will act responsibly may 
reassure public officials, LEPCs should include such 
groups in the design of risk communication pro~rams 
and, if possible, get their endorsement before gOIng to 
office holders for support. 
Arguably, LEPCs should not undertake any major risk 
communication effort without being sure that pubhc 
officials are aware of its purpose and methods in ad-
vance. If the activity sparks controversy and officials 
have not been informed about it, they may feel betrayed 
and withdraw support for LEPC efforts. 
7. Public Resistance: There is a widespread perception 
among LEPC members that most citizens just don't pay 
attention to environmental hazards. Psychology and 
communications studies provide plenty of reasons for 
this behavior (see, for example, Douglas, 1985; Marks, 
1990; Perrow, 1984). Among the more prominent expla-
nations are the following: 
Most environmental hazards pose a threat only in the 
future, while people have their hands full dealing with 
immediate problems; 
Peoplehaveto be prepared to receive complex messages, 
andmost citizens do not have the knowledge orbackround 
to understand risk infonnation, and as a result, ignore it; 
Modem communications techniques flood people with 
messages that claim to be important, so that it is very 
difficult for anyone message to get through. 
Together, these and other factors produce what appears 
as public apathy toward hazardous materials issues. But 
a variety of psychological processes also work to create 
actual resistance to risk messages. For example, the risks 
ofa chemical accident often are beyond the control of the 
average individual, but have the potential of being over-
whelming. Accepting this reality means accepting one's 
own vulnerability and can create fears that are emotion-
ally painful. To avoid this discomfort, people may 
engage in denial, ignoring the danger and refusing to take 
steps to prepare for an emergency. 
Suggestions for ways to overcome this resistance are 
both procedural and substantive. Procedurally, it is vital 
that authorities be able to point to an open, balanced 
process by which hazards were analyzed and selected for 
attention, the content of messages was developed, and 
risk management plans were laid. Only then are skepti-
cal citizens more likely to accept information and in-
structions as legitimate (Fessenden-Raden et aI., 1987). 
For a process to be "open and balanced," citizens from a 
variety of backgrounds should be selected to participate 
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by a disinterested party, and the citizen members of the 
group must have more than advisory authority in deter-
mination of the final outcomes. 
Substantively, there are a variety of measures that can 
help overcome public resistance to risk messages (see, 
for example, NRC, 1989). First, LEPCs must study their 
intended audience and design messages specifically for 
it. The goal is to discover relevant facts about the 
audience (e.g., where they work, shop, and play; how 
mobile they are) and to understand their concerns and 
values (e.g., what health fears they have; what hazards 
they worry about). 
Second, LEPCs should not assume that one message will 
reach all groups. It is vital to segment the audience and 
design appeals tailored to the concerns and interests of 
each segment. This will mean using not only different 
"appeals," but also different methods ofdelivery-talks 
to civic groups, videos, direct mailings, TV spots, etc. 
Third, it is essential to pretest messages. The fact that a 
message is technically accurate does not mean that it will 
communicate the desired content or have the desired 
emotional impact (Slovic, 1987). Before finalizing the 
message, it is essential to present draft versions to small 
samples of the intended audience in controlled environ-
ments and to discuss what they leamed and how they 
were made to feel. This will reduce the chances of 
unintended consequences. 
Fourth, messages should be tied to immediate concerns 
and behaviors. People are more likely to be motivated by 
immediate problems than by distant ones and are more 
likely to hear and respond to a message if there is 
something they can do with the information. It also 
helps, where possible, to provide citizens with a concrete 
reminder of the message, like a phone plate, bumper 
sticker, key chain, or fact card. 
Fifth, suggestions for concrete defensive measures that 
citizens can take always should accompany risk mes-
sages. Alerting people to a danger without offering them 
a way to protect themselves only creates fear and can 
encourage them to "tune out" the warning. 
Sixth, risks should be explained using layman's terms 
and familiar comparisons, when possible. Most people 
are intimidated by chemical names and statistics and 
often will ignore messages that are ladened heavily with 
them. 
Seventh, risk communication should be viewed as an 
ongoing process. It will be necessary to repeat informa-
tion campaigns on a regular basis, due to population 
turnover, fading memories, and changes in individual 
circumstances. 
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Eighth, where possible, hazardous materials risk com-
munication efforts should be integrated with natural 
hazards education efforts to maximize impact and re-
duce duplication. 
8. Popular Misperceptions of Risks: Those responsible for 
communicating about chemical hazards often express 
frustration over what they perceive as the public's ten-
dency to misunderstand risks. On the one hand (as 
discussed above), people sometimes disregard risks when 
experts feel that they should be far more concerned and 
should take precautionary actions. On the other hand, 
officials often fear that citizens will become excessively 
concerned about relatively minor risks if "agitated" by 
public discussion of the risks-as when they oppose 
construction of a hazardous waste treatment facility that 
experts think will pose little danger (Bord et aI., 1991). 
The public does not always see risks in the same context 
as public officials or scientific experts (Krimsky and 
Plough, 1988). However, problems develop when offi-
cials are too cautious about giving citizens the infoffila-
tion they may need to protect themselves or to participate 
effectively in public policy debate. When this happens, 
responders and planners often make their own tasks 
more difficult by leaving the public in the dark (Johnson 
et aI., 1988). Uninformed citizens may nottake the right 
steps in an emergency and can not be counted on to 
pressure government to support emergency prepared-
ness fully. Moreover, poorly informed citizens will be 
less able to contribute insights and suggestions to the 
planning process. The challenge, then, is to inform 
citizens of hazards in ways that provide adequate moti-
vation for them to take necessary defensive measures 
and become involved in the debate over risk reduction 
and emergency preparedness, but that do not create an 
overreaction. 
First, it is important to recognize that there is no way to 
guarantee that citizens will reach the conclusions that 
officials want them to draw from risk information; there-
fore, it is a mistake to consider risk communication 
efforts successful only ifcitizens accept the official view 
as a result. In a democratic society, citizens are given 
infonnation so that they can reach their own conclusions 
about what is an acceptable risk or an appropriate risk 
management measure. 
There are, however, ways to increase the chances that 
risk infoffilation will be taken seriously and an overreac-
tion will be avoided. First, it is important to rely on 
trusted sources to convey the message. Since research 
suggests that citizens view medical professionals as 
highly credible (McCallum et al., 1990), LEPCs are well 
advised to establish contacts with the local medical 
communities and to enlist their aid in reaching the public 
with information. Similarly, environmental groups and 
academics generally are regarded by the public as trust-
worthy (Bord et al., 1991) and should be utilized in risk 
communication. Second, attentive citizens are more 
likely to trust information if they have a chance to 
question the source and explore assumptions behind 
conclusions (Slovic, 1987). For that reason, whenever 
possible, it is wise to present especially important or 
sensitive infonnation in public forums where there can 
be two-way communication between citizens and offi-
cials. Such forums should be a regular part of risk 
communication efforts and should be designed to en-
courage questions and expressions of opinions from 
citizens. Third, it generally will help to diversify the 
range of persons involved in response planning so that 
likely critics (environmental groups, for example) are 
well-informed and do not promote misperceptions by 
challenging the validity of official statements exclu-
sively as a result of having incomplete information. 
Formally including such groups in the presentations at 
public forums can help persuade citizens that the process 
is open. 
When accidents do occur, it is important to monitor the 
risk content of emergency messages and follow up to 
correct any misperceptions that may have been created. 
Citizens may overestimate or underestimate lingering 
health risks after an incident and may, therefore, either 
worry unnecessarily or fail to take needed precautions to 
avoid adverse health effects. If there is reason to think 
misperceptions are common, officials should attempt to 
correct them with direct mailing or phone calls, if pos-
sible. 
9. Media Indifference to Issues: There is a widespread 
perception among LEPC members that, in the absence of 
a dramatic event such as an accident or reports of safety 
violations, the media are not sufficiently concerned with 
chemical risks. Whether this disinterest stems from the 
media's lack of understanding of what is at stake in 
situations involving hazardous materials or from differ-
ences in what the media and public officials consider to 
be "a story," the effect is that there seldom is a strong 
alliance between risk communicators and the local me-
dia. 
While some progress can be made by appealing to the 
civic responsibility of the media to promote public 
safety, in most cases LEPCs must attempt to meet the 
needs of the media if they are to get adequate coverage 
ofhazardous materials issues (see National Safety Coun-
cil, no date.). It is important to recognize that the media 
are businesses, as well as public servants, which means 
that securing an audience may be as important to them as 
telling the "truth." They may not even seek to uncover a 
single truth; rather, as Sandman (1986) has suggested, 
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they may set out to present competing claims as fairly as 
possible, leaving the task of detennining truth to the 
readers. 
Two strategies are among those that can help to improve 
media coverage of hazardous materials issues. The first 
involves the development of better working relation-
ships between the media and LEPCs. A highly recom-
mended approach is for LEPCs to hold annual "media-
responder workshops," in which key members of the 
local media are brought together with emergency plan-
ners and responders so that each can learn about the 
issues and job demands of the other. Media people can 
be educated about the facts of chemical risks and re-
sponse techniques so they can be better infonned, mati-
vatedreporters ofhazardous materials stories. Respond-
ers can learn how to make a story attractive to the media. 
It also can help for each LEPC to develop a "press kit," 
which provides reporters with background information 
that will enhance their ability to cover stories involving 
hazardous materials under both emergency and 
nonemergency conditions. The press kit should include 
information on the Title 1Il planning process and any 
local efforts to inform the public about chemical hazards 
or emergency response procedures. 
In order to further improve interaction with the media, 
LEPCs should seek to develop ongoing working rela-
tionships with specific reporters who are assigned to 
cover environmental issues or local government in their 
area. These people should be kept well-informed of 
LEPC activities and given material for stories, whenever 
possible. Local committees also should see their media 
representative members as resources and learn all they 
can from them about the operation of the media. 
Our observations suggest that media representatives 
seldom are active members of the LEPC and may feel a 
certain conflict of interest in being in the position ofboth 
contributing to the making of news (as a Committee 
member) and reporting it. For that reason, it usually is 
unwise to recruit as members of the LEPC those report-
ers who are most likely to cover hazardous materials 
issues. At a minimum, their membership may reduce 
their credibility with the public. 
The second strategy for increasing media attention in-
volves the linking of chemical safety news to other 
community issues, such as education, economic devel-
opment, or transportation. This can be done through 
such tactics as getting community organizations to spon-
sor hazardous materials education efforts and involving 
the public in the planning process through public forums 
that warrant news coverage. In addition, LEPCs should 
not shy away from controversy, as this is both a good way 
to bring out useful new information and perspectives and 
a way to ensure media attention. 
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10. Insufficient Channels for Reaching the Public: Even if 
LEPCs are clear about their risk communication objec-
tives and know how to frame their messages, they still 
may be stymied by their inability to deliver information 
to the public. In part, this is simply a question of how to 
cut through the torrent of information and images to 
which Americans are exposed, in order to capture citi-
zens' attention. In addition, however, the question of 
channels is an issue ofcredibility. Having the public hear 
your message is only effective if the public also regards 
the message as trustworthy. Citizens often distrust infor-
mation about chemical hazards and do not regard all 
sources as equally knowledgeable orbelievable (Krimsky 
and Plough, 1988). The task here is to find methods of 
getting messages to people in ways that will maximize 
the chances that they actually will listen to them and 
accept them as true. 
Rather than trying to carve new channels, LEPCs can 
make use of existing lines of communication about 
health and matters of community welfare more effi-
ciently. One strategy is to undertake a study of the 
sources that people already rely on for information on 
health and community welfare issues in a given commu-
nity. Once these channels are identified, the LEPC can 
use them to attempt to get its messages out. In addition, 
it usually will be helpful to enlist the aid of the local 
medical community. Not only should medical personnel 
be used as spokespersons, but also they should be edu-
cated about chemical hazards and encouraged to discuss 
the issue with patients, whenever relevant. 
CONCLUSION 
Local Emergency Planning Committees have a unique op-
portunity to focus public attention on local environmental 
issues and promote long-range thinking about these issues. 
To take advantage of this opportunity, the local committees 
will have to become far more proactive in their risk commu-
nication efforts. We believe that there are many possible 
grounds on which to make the case for LEPCs to pay greater 
attention to nonemergency risk communication; however, as 
indicated in this paper, its potential contribution to fulfilling 
the LEPCs' emergency planning mission may be sufficient. 
Thus, the present ambiguity of Congressional expectations 
with regard to the LEPCs' role in risk communication need 
not be an issue. The most important task, we believe, is to 
mount a major educational and administrative support effort, 
first to persuade the LEPCs ofthe importance ofnonemergency 
risk communication, and then to assist them in doing it 
successfully. 
Critical to this effort is the definition of a proper role for 
LEPCs--{)ne that has them planning for proactive risk com-
munication without being expected to undertake the commu-
nication by themselves. Given the LEPCs' current lack of 
resources in most places, it would be unrealistic to expect 
more of them. The LEPCs do need to know what efforts are 
RISK COMMUNICATION UNDER SARA 
required, and they need to persuade other public and private 
organizations to undertake these efforts. It is evident that they 
face many problems in doing so, but this paper has indicated 
that knowledge and strategies are available to help them 
overcome the barriers. 
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